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   1 
THE FUTURE OF EUROPEAN UNION EXTERNAL RELATIONS: 
FROM A ‘PASS-THE-BUCK’ STRATEGY TO A COMMON VOICE? 
 
 
 
 
Since 1993, when the European Union came into being, the number of writings 
identifying the European Union as an important actor on the world scene has grown 
considerably. A book edited by Robert J. Gutman in 2001, has a very challenging 
subtitle: Europe in the New Century: Visions of an Emerging Superpower. Presently, 
however, most works dealing with the European Union are epitomized by the well-
known leitmotif “the European Union is an economic giant and a political dwarf” – 
meaning that to a certain extent “the hour of Europe” is not yet here, and the road toward 
becoming a superpower is tremendously difficult. The Bush II administration’s New 
National Security Strategy tries to ensure that the “hour of Europe” will never come. One 
of the most striking elements of the new strategy document is its insistence "that the 
president has no intention of allowing any foreign power to catch up with the huge lead 
the United States has opened since the fall of the Soviet Union more than a decade ago."
1 
This is another way of saying that America will deter its friends as well as its enemies, if 
necessary.  The new strategy document is a powerful display of the Bush administration’s 
offensive realist impulses. The question is where does all of this leave the European 
Union? What is its future as an international actor and what are the determinants that will 
further shape its role in the world and the conduct of its external relations and of its 
Common Foreign and Security Policy? 
  
In trying to answer these questions this paper starts from the assumption that 
external relations and foreign policy are a by-product of international factors as well as of 
internal factors. Therefore the paper is structured as follows: part one assesses the 
position of the European Union in the international system and determines the major 
international factors that will impact the future of the EU and consequently the future of 
its external relations. The second part identifies internal EU factors that impact the realm 
of its external relations.  The third part will asses the role played by the Convention on 
the future of Europe, and will attempt to outline some “visions of the European Union’s 
future”.  
 
International Factors and their Impact on the Union  
 
The international factors that will be discussed in this section are the following: power 
distribution in the international system; pressures of globalization; aid; and EU 
enlargement. 
 
The basic assumption of this section is that the European Union is a sub-system of 
the international system. The European Union grew as a part of the core of Western states 
                                                           
1 David E. Sanger, “Bush Outlines Doctrine of Striking Foes First,” New York Times, September 20, 2002.   2 
which in the late twentieth century developed an intense set of shared rules, norms and 
institutions. As Barry Buzan argues  “the EU constitutes a kind of core-within-a core with 
its member states creating such a thick web of common law and institutions, penetrating 
so deeply into their societies, that it is no longer altogether clear whether they should be 
seen as a set of highly “like” units, or as some kind of sui-generis confederal unit – in 
some senses an actor in its own right in international society.”
2  The conventional 
wisdom today is that the EU is a sui generis body, built in the beginning on a pragmatic 
and apolitical functionalist basis, in which cooperation was aimed at accomplishing 
specific technical tasks: “the focus in the early phase was on survival and performance”, 
as Caporaso argues. Later, the “EU went far beyond its original task it set for itself.”  
Two powerful developments generated a new set of expectations. “These two 
developments had to do with the expansion of market relations across Europe and the 
growth of the EC’s political institutions.”
3  
 
Returning to issues of international politics, such as the concept of anarchy, some 
scholars argue that anarchy among EU member states has been  attenuated by complex 
(or mutual interdependence), which at  its highest peak was transformed into economic 
integration flanked by attempts at political and social integration. Therefore, the anarchy 
inside the EU reached a phase of maturity (Barry Buzan), which somewhat equates with 
peace. Other scholars, mainly realists, claim that peace came about in the EU only 
because NATO (read the United States of America) offered Western Europe a security 
umbrella under which prosperity and peace have flourished.  
 
However, if the EU is at peace, the external environment in which it operates 
remains anarchical in essence and plagued by wars and conflicts. Moreover, the world 
outside the EU is not only anarchical and consequently very conflictual, but the 
distribution of military power is extremely uneven. The United States is the sole and 
“lonely superpower,” at least in military capabilities. Jonathan Freedland argues that 
notions such as “sole superpower,” or “hyperpower,” a term favored mostly by the 
French, or “hegemon,” a term  employed by academics, might be too mild, for in 
describing the United States “the word of the hour is empire.”
4  If this empire helped  
build a peaceful and prosperous European Union, lately, with the war on terrorism, the 
conflict in the Middle East and an apparent imminent attack on Iraq, America has 
transformed itself, I will argue, from “Europe’s pacifier” into “Europe’s headache.”  
 
The important question here is what is the European Union’s response to the latest 
developments in the international arena? In regard to the Middle East, even if Europe 
found a common voice, the Union’s  lack of military power confers little potency to its 
voice. With respect to Iraq, the Union has been speaking with “many voices.”  There is 
no European  “common voice” that can be heard in Washington. The three big players of 
the Union, Britain, France, and Germany speak for themselves, not for Europe. Therefore 
                                                           
2 Barry Buzan and Richard Little, International Systems in World History: Remaking the Study of 
International Relations, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2000, p. 338. 
3 James A. Caporaso, The European Union: Dilemmas of Regional Integration, Boulder: Westview Press, 
2000, p. 49.  
4 Jonathan Freedland, “Rome, AD…Rome, DC?” The Guardian, September 18, 2002.    3 
if the European Union has developed  common positions with respect to Russia, Ukraine 
and the Mediterranean, it certainly  lacks  a common position in regard to the United 
States.  Unless, of course the EU wants to call the new division of labor which seems to 
have emerged in the international system – America does the bombing and Europe does 
the cleaning up afterwards – a sort of a “European informal common position” with 
respect to the United States.  As long as the European Union does not have a unified 
position with respect to the United States, and moreover has no military capabilities to 
counterbalance American power, its chances of becoming a “superpower” are pretty slim. 
Therefore it is not going out on a limb to say that the present distribution of power in the 
international system negatively impacts the chances of the European Union becoming a 
superpower in the foreseeable future. Furthermore, the future of the EU’s external 
relations and Common Foreign and Security Policy are also impacted. It is very difficult 
to create a common political voice for the EU, when in many instances, EU member 
states’ national interests are divergent. Regional conflicts are differently perceived in 
different member states. Consequently the response of the Union with respect to 
international crises is chaotic. The U.S. administration constantly complains that Europe 
does not speak with one voice, knowing very well that for Europe it is difficult to find 
that very desired common voice. The U.S. administration is also very aware that even if 
Europe did have a common voice, it would not be taken into consideration by 
Washington, unless Europe could militarily back up its common voice.   
 
Nonetheless, as Jessica T. Mathews argues, “recent unilateral US behavior on 
matters that command wide international support maybe pushing the EU into political 
coherence faster than the Union could otherwise achieve it.”
5  This is an argument which 
deserves a detailed analysis, for if the present distribution of military power at the level of 
the international system negatively impacts the Union, it may at the same time increase 
the determination of political leaders inside the Union to find a way of building a 
“common voice” much sooner than might have been expected.        
 
The challenges posed to the European Union by the distribution of military power 
at the level of the international system is not the only  factor that impacts the EU. Some 
scholars argue that the Union has to mount a coherent defense against the disintegrating 
pressures of globalization. However, the process of globalization creates several 
methodological and empirical difficulties in trying to asses its precise impact on the EU.   
Daniel W. Drezner argues that very important in the study of globalization is the rescue 
of the concept itself from pop-commentators. “One reason that globalization is 
important,” Drezner points out, “is the perception by many scholars and policymakers 
that it transforms international politics. The evidence to date reject this perception. 
Globalization is not deterministic: there is no single predicted location for policy 
convergence.”
6 
                                                           
5 Jessica T. Mathews, “Estranged Partners,” Foreign Policy, November/December 2001.  
6 Daniel W. Drezner, “Globalization and Policy Convergence,” International Studies Review, Vol. 3, 1, 
Spring 2001.    4 
  Despite Drezner’s conclusion one can identify disintegration as well as 
integration pressures mounted by globalization with respect to the European Union. On 
the one hand, firms facing competitive threats from world markets may intensify their 
lobby for further liberalization of the European market space, which in return may impact 
policy making processes in the European Union. On the other hand, as Ben 
Rosamond(1999) argues, “the Commission has shown a tendency in recent years to 
define the external environment as ‘globalized’ and, therefore, threatening to the 
competitiveness of the European economy. This not only coincides with and supports 
preferences for market liberalization, but also help to legitimize European-level action, as 
opposed to a reversion to national solutions.”
7 Therefore one can identify the 
Commission’s tendency to use some aspects of globalization in order to reinforce actions 
on a supranational level. Areas such as terrorism, drug-trafficking, trafficking in human 
beings, and migration have received intensified support for a coherent European level 
action. Globalization, to a large extent, has generated powerful new incentives for 
Europe’s integration.
8 
 
There is a third aspect of the international arena, more or less short of serious 
disorder, that impacts the EU’s role as a international actor. Different sets of countries 
continue to harbor great hopes of what the EU can do for them.
9 One set of these 
countries is the developing countries, another set is constituted by the states of East Asia 
and a third set is composed of the member states of ASEM. In terms of aid “given the 
United States’ established preference for encouraging development through tough 
conditionality and self-reliance, needy states will continue to look to the EU as their main 
source of salvation”.
10 Therefore they will continue to pressure the Union in order to 
obtain help. For instance, since the fall of the Berlin Wall countries encompassed by the 
Lome Convention have intensified their pressure on the Union, feeling threatened by the 
EU’s relations with countries in Central and Eastern Europe, and by the whole 
enlargement process. Consequently the competition over EU aid has intensified. The EU 
solved this problem by creating a separate service for enlargement, presently headed by 
Commissioner Verheugen.  The candidate countries were given a special separate status 
with respect to other regions of the world that also receive aid form the Union.  
 
Apart from the enlargement process, the question here is what prompts Europe to 
be the largest donor of the world and, consequently, to keep the aid flowing toward 
countries in need. How this flow of aid concretely helps the Union is not clear. Some 
scholars and policymakers have argued that it is necessary, for it boosts support for the 
European position in different international organizations such as the United Nations and 
the WTO.   
                                                           
7 Ben Rosamond, Theories of European Integration, New York: St. Martin Press, 2000. 
8 David P. Calleo, Rethinking Europe’s Future, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 2001, p. 150.  
9 Christopher Hill, “Closing the Capabilities-Expectation Gap?” in A Common Foreign policy for Europe? 
Competing Visions of the CFSP, John Peterson and Helen Sjursen (eds.), New York: Routledge, 1998.  
10 Ibid.   5 
Nonetheless there is another important factor that pushes the Union to keep the 
aid flowing: “security reasons” on the Union’s eastern borders. In addressing this issue, 
and to give only one example, the EU has been the largest donor to Kosovo, giving it 
some 1 billion euros. It gave the province 320 million euros in 2001 and 134 million 
euros last year.  On September 19, 2002, Commissioner Chris Patten said in Prishtina that 
the Union will give Kosovo only 50 million euros ($49 million) in aid next year, nearly a 
two thirds cut from its 2002 support. Commissioner Patten said: "Kosovo has been a 
terrific success story, but  the story isn't over.... As Kosovo moves from crisis to 
normality, our help is shifting from a focus on physical reconstruction to building strong 
institutions to help your politicians deliver effective government, justice, and a robust 
economy."
11 However, the consequences of cutting the aid for Kosovo remain to be seen. 
Presently, the vision of the European Union, as a panacea for underdevelopment- a vision 
that emerged in the 1990s - has vanished. Still, countries in need outside the EU seem to 
retain elements of that vision. In the international arena, the EU –as the largest donor of 
the world - is perceived by most countries as the “good guy,” while the United States is 
increasingly perceived as “the bad guy.” 
 
  The enlargement process is another “external” factor which has mounted 
pressures on the European Union. Since the fall of the Berlin Wall, quickly followed by 
the German reunification, scholars of the European Union have emphasized that one of 
the most salient consequences to come would be the enlargement of the European Union. 
Great pressure has been placed on candidate countries to accomplish the acquis 
communautaire, an established institutional framework of the EU,  in order to be eligible 
for membership in the Union. Strong claims have been made that enlargement 
disadvantages candidate countries by excluding them from the decision making process, 
by requiring them to accept the institutional framework for European laws and 
procedures in full, and by placing the onus of change on candidate countries.
12 
 
However, the enlargement process also holds strong challenges for the European 
Union. From agricultural and environmental problems, to issues of identity and 
migration, a myriad of invitations to competitive actions lie ahead for political and 
economic actors involved in one way or another in the enlargement process.  Hans van 
den Broek, former EU Commissioner for External Relations in charge of the enlargement 
process, once said “The European Union is not trying to join the Czech Republic,” but 
since then things have changed. Targeting the Union’s institutional reform, one could 
argue that the irony of Europe’s planned enlargement into Eastern Europe is that – 
despite howls of pain from redundant Polish steelworkers and downsized Czech 
businesses – by the end of 1999 it was already having more impact on the European 
                                                           
11 As reported by Radio Free Europe/Radio Liberty; RFE/RL Newsline, Vol. 6, No. 178, September 20, 
2002.  
12 John K. Glenn, “European Enlargement and the Transformation of the Nation-State,” paper presented at 
the ECSA 2001 International Conference, Madison, Wisconsin.    6 
Union than on the candidate countries.”
13   The admission of the poor easterners into the 
European Union not only requires extensive institutional changes, but also dramatic 
modifications to the way the Union finances its budget and allocates its structural funds, 
which were designed to level regional inequalities.
14  
In sum, this section has tried to asses the impact of the international factors on the 
European Union. It claims the following:  (1) The present distribution of power in the 
international system negatively impacts the chances of the European Union to speak with 
one voice. At the same time, however, Washington’s unilateralist behavior might increase 
the EU leaders’ determination to find a “common voice.”  (2) Globalization forces are 
mounting disintegration as well as integration forces on the European Union. 
Nonetheless, globalization constitutes an incentive for the European Commission to 
legitimate European-level action.  (3) Demands for aid coming from developing countries 
add to the determination of the EU to remain the world’s biggest donor; however claims 
are made that by keeping the aid flowing the European Union tries to reinforce its 
position in different international organizations such as the United Nations and the WTO 
(4) The enlargement process certainly is having a great impact on the Union. The 
expansion toward the east is seen as necessary in order “to provide stability in the more 
troublesome part of the continent and in order to protect fledgling democracy there.”
15  
Moreover, there is no question about that the future enlargement of the Union makes 
weaknesses that might have been tolerated before unacceptable in the future. This is, as 
Helen Wallace argues, “especially so when there is such a pressing agenda in the field of 
foreign and defense policies, where the Union is being challenged to demonstrate a real 
capacity to act and to deliver solid and sustainable commitments.”
16   
 
In trying to asses the most important international factors that impact the Union’s 
external relations and foreign policy one runs into a crucial problem – namely the 
hierarchy between military power and economic power. For neo- institutionalists of our 
époque the answer is clear: economic interdependence because it generates peace. For 
realists, the answer is military power – and starting with this assumption realists easily 
can craft the following hypothesis: the chances of the EU member states agreeing on any 
external issue are inversely proportional to the issue’s importance. Nonetheless, there is 
another branch of realism called defensive realism which argues that expansion strategies 
are self-defeating. From this point of view all the Union has to do in order to become a 
superpower is to wait for an international decline of the United States caused by “the 
problem of imperial overstretch”.  In today’s interdependent world, a strategy like this 
could be very tricky. An economic decline of the United States might also trigger 
economic decline in Europe. Consequently, Europe needs to enforce its economic 
presence in Asia and Latin America.  
                                                           
13 Martin Walker, “Enlargement of the European Union: How New EU Members will Change the Shape of 
Europe,” Europe in the New Century: Visions of an Emerging Superpower, Robert J. Guttman (ed.), 
Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 2001, p. 58.  
14  Ibid, p. 61. 
15 Stanley Hoffman, “Toward a Common European Foreign and Security Policy?” Journal of Common 
Market Studies, June 2000, Vol. 38, No.2.  
16 Philippe de Schoutheete and Helen Wallace, “The European Council,” Research and European Issues, 
No. 19, September 2002.    7 
Internal Factors and Their Impact on the European’s Foreign Policy 
 
This section addresses the following question: What are the internal EU factors that shape 
its external relations and its foreign policy? In trying to answer this question, this section 
will analyze Europe’s Common Foreign and Security Policy as it stands today, and the 
role played by the European Commission.    
 
Common Foreign and Security Policy  
 
The idea of creating a Common Foreign and Security Policy for the European Union, as a 
mechanism for coordination, can be traced back to the creation of the European Political 
Cooperation in the early 1970s. The CFSP’s forerunner, the European Political 
Cooperation (EPC), was established on October 27, 1970, when the foreign ministers of 
the European Community adopted the Luxembourg Report. Twenty years later, on   
November 1, 1993, the Treaty on European Union entered into force and brought into 
being the Common Foreign and Security Policy.
17  
 
This CFSP has been the subject of much analysis. Some have even called into 
question the utility of a body such as the CFSP and have claimed that it is difficult 
enough to compose a single EU voice. To compose a voice to which others would listen 
appears to be impossible without a militarily muscular body.
18  Claims have been made 
that “foreign policy is not steel and coal,” and consequently no seminal steps could be 
taken in favor of a real political integration. The concept of a Common Foreign and 
Security Policy, initially formulated by Helmut Kohl and François Mitterrand, was 
written into the Treaty of the European Union without any in-depth discussion of its 
meaning and its implications. No serious debate took place in regard to the Common 
Foreign and Security Policy.
19 If one compares this to the treatment of a similarly 
complex and important objective – namely Economic and Monetary Union (EMU) – the 
contrast is clear. A group of central bankers and experts, chaired by Jacques Delors, 
debated for more than a year and drafted a detailed report of EMU even before the 
intergovernmental conference was called. Nothing similar was ever attempted for foreign 
and security policy.
20 
 
 
                                                           
17 Simon Nuttall, “Two Decades of EPC Performance,” Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC 
to CFSP and Beyond. Elfriede Regelsberger, Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervarent, and Wolfgang Wessels 
(eds.), Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997.  
18 Desmond Dinan, Ever Closer Union: An Introduction to European Integration, Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 
1999. 
19 Philippe de Schoutheete de Tervatent, “The Creation of the Common Foreign and Security Policy,” 
Foreign Policy of the European Union: From EPC to CFSP and Beyond. Elfriede Regelsberger, Philippe de 
Schoutheete de Tervarent, and Wolfgang Wessels (eds.), Boulder: Lynne Rienner, 1997.  
20  Ibid.   8 
The Amsterdam treaty spells out five major objectives for the CFSP: 
 
-  to safeguard common values, fundamental interests, independence and 
integrity of the Union in conformity with the principles of the United 
Nations Charter; 
-  to strengthen the security of the Union in all ways; 
-  to preserve peace and strengthen international security; 
-  to promote international cooperation; and, 
-  to develop and consolidate democracy and the rule of law, and respect 
for human rights and fundamental freedoms.
21 
 
In an effort to clarify and enhance the means available to the CFSP, the Treaty of 
Amsterdam (Article 12 TEU) identifies four policy instruments: Principles and 
guidelines -adopted by the European Council- provide general political directions. 
Common strategies -adopted by the European Council- establish an umbrella under 
which the Council may adopt joint actions and common positions by QMV (except those 
with military and defense implications); Joint actions -adopted by the European Council- 
are further refined to address specific situations requiring “operational actions”; and 
Common positions.
22 There are two broad contributions of the Commission to CFSP. On 
the one hand, the Commission is “fully associated with the CFSP work; it has a right of 
policy initiative, manages the CFSP budget and brings to the CFSP debate the EC policy 
areas where it has a clearly defined role. On the other hand, the Commission plays a role 
as external representative in all European Community areas.
23 
 
From an instrumental rationalist viewpoint, the difficulties of moving towards a 
real Common Foreign and Security Policy are seen as resulting from divergent policy 
goals among the member state governments, and of course, from the high premium 
placed by states upon foreign policy autonomy.
24 The whole issue of Europe’s Common 
Foreign and Security Policy is strongly related to intergovernmentalism which may relate 
to formal institutional reality, but it cannot capture the emerging norms and rules of the 
game, the governance regime of CFSP.
25  In this regard the actors in the process of treaty 
negotiation are very diverse: Commission officials, national ministers and prime 
ministers, Members of the European Parliament and public servants.
26 Therefore, I will 
argue that CFSP, to a certain degree, displays  some tendencies toward supranationalism, 
especially fostered  by the European Commission’s role in CFSP.  
                                                           
21 Website of the European Union http://europe.eu.int/external_relations/cfsp/intro/index.htm.  
22 Dinan. 
23 Website of the European Union.  
24 Rosamond, p. 121. 
25 Ibid, p. 174. 
26 Thomas Christiansen and Knud Erik Jørgensen, “The Amsterdam Process: A Structurationist Perspective 
on EU Treaty Reform,” European Integration online Papers (EioP), Vol. 3, No. 1, 1999, http://eiop.or.at/ 
eiop/text/1999-001a.htm   9 
 
However, the Common Foreign and Security Policy was not always efficient in 
making decisions or in implementing them. Consequently “treaty modification has 
become a regular diet for heads of government and they are not always good at it: 
Amsterdam produced important leftovers and Nice was so chaotic that Tony Blair 
concluded that ‘we cannot go on working like this.’”
27 The need for reform became 
urgent.  
 
 
The Role of the Commission  
 
The European Commission’s primary responsibilities include: proposing and shaping 
legislation, administering and implementing Community policy, managing the budget, 
conducting external relations, policing Community law, and pointing the way forward.
28 
 
The European Union website informs internet surfers that the Prodi Commission 
has undertaken a fundamental restructuring of the European Commission’s services 
dealing with external relations. Six Commissioners –in charge of six external relations 
services – share responsibilities. The External Relations Directorate-General is headed by 
Commissioner Chris Patten. Gunter Verheugen heads the enlargement, Pascal Lamy the 
trade, and Paul Nielson heads the Development Directorate-General, the Humanitarian 
Aid Office, and together with Commissioner Patten, the EuropeAid Cooperation Office. 
In general the tasks of the External Relations Directorate-General are the following: 
relations with European countries that are not members of the European Union and not 
part of the enlargement process; relations with South Eastern Europe, Caucasus and the 
Central Asian Republics; relations with North America, Australia, Japan, and Korea; 
relations with the Middle East and the Southern Mediterranean; Latin America; relations 
with international organizations i.e. United Nations, NATO, WEU, OSCE, the Council of 
Europe, assures the Commission’s participation in the Common Foreign and Security 
Policy and administrates more than 120 Commission delegations in third countries (the 
external service).
29    
 
As Michel Bauer argues the desire to reform the European Commission is almost 
as old as the institution itself. DECODE, SEM 2000, MAP 2000, ABB, ABM and IAS 
are the latest acronyms in the long list of projects to reshuffle the organization ‘at the 
heart of the Union’.
30 The new institutionalism in organization theory opens up new 
avenues for thinking about the relationship between culture or ideas, and institutional 
development. Policy makers are said to initiate policies or organizational reforms because 
the latter have been validated by the relevant cultural authorities or in the forums that are 
                                                           
27 de Schoutheete and Wallace.  
28 Dinan. 
29 Internet available on the website of the European Union 
http://europa.eu.int/comm/dgs/external_relations/general/mission_en.htm  
30 Michael W. Bauer, “Reforming the European Commission – A (missed?) Academic Opportunity,” 
European Integration online Papers (EIoP), Vol. 6, 2002. internet available at 
http://eiop.or.at/eiop/texte/2002 - 008a.htm.    10  
indispensable reference points for their spheres of endeavor.
31 The website of the 
European Union informs us with respect to the new reform that “one of the key changes 
already carried out, is the transfer of management responsibility for external assistance 
projects to a local level: 21 Commission Delegation offices in third countries have 
already taken over management projects, and by the end of the year the figure will be 
nearly 50”.
32  Spence (2002) argues that past reforms had little impact on the 
Commission’s institutional development. The crucial question is the following: Does the 
current reform have any chance of breaking this trend? Bauer’s answer is “probably yes”, 
because, “Never before has the change of the internal management culture been pursued 
so comprehensively and seriously”.
33 Thus the management of the Union’s external 
affairs  could be positively impacted by the new reform in the foreseeable future .   
 
   
Conclusions  
 
What are the European Union’s accomplishments in the realm of external relations and 
Common Foreign and Security Policy? The answer is that the Union has played a 
tremendous role in the democratization processes in Central and Eastern Europe, a role 
that is not sufficiently explored by academics. It disbursed  a great amount of aid 
throughout the world. It opened political dialogues with regions such as Latin America 
and  East Asia.  Reality shows that in matters of “soft issues” Europe can find a common 
voice, which seems to surprise even Commissioner Patten, who recently said in an 
interview: “Foreign Policy goes right to the heart of what it means to be a sovereign state. 
The wonder is that we manage to develop common positions on as many issues as we 
do.”
34 
 
However, in security matters things were, and are, more difficult. Since 1993 one 
clearly detects  EU’s efforts to address security. By the end of the 1990s, after the wars in 
Bosnia and Kosovo,  a more autonomous capacity for collective security seemed 
increasingly significant for the EU’s overall cohesion and momentum.
35 The first step in 
making the EU a truly effective international power was to be fulfilled at Laeken by 
launching an “operational” European security and defense force.  The important question 
is how all this is going to impact the future of the Union? Prior to the Laeken Declaration, 
in trying to answer this question, Rosamond brought to attention Ole Waever’s argument 
(1998) that the achievement of a security community in the EU was fulfilled through a 
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process of “desecuritization”. The deepening of the formal European integration has 
brought “security” back to the agenda, preeminently with the aspiration to create a true 
Common Foreign and Security Policy - and  this could become a threat to the stability of 
the EU because it “re-securitizes” the agenda, which in turn, may be the source of 
insecurity.
36    
 
As long as the European Union does not have a common political voice backed by 
military power, Commissioner Chris Patten’s words are very true:  “the EU is not a 
superpower in the traditional sense.”  Nevertheless, Commissioner Patten continued: “and 
does not cherish the ambition to become one.”
37  It is doubtful whether this last part of his 
statement reflects the view of all major EU political actors.  
  
 
The Future of the EU’s External Relations 
 
In trying to outline possible future versions of the European Union, this section will look 
at the following: the Laeken Declaration and the work of the Convention.  
 
The Laeken Declaration (December, 15, 2001) outlines the stringent need for 
EU institutional reform. Boldly, the Declaration also established a Convention on the 
Future of Europe which had its inaugural meeting on March 1, 2002.  Mr. Valery Giscard 
d’Estaing was appointed as Chairman of the Convention by the European Council. He is 
flanked by Mr. G. Amato and Mr. J.L. Dehaene as Vice-Chairmen. The Convention’s 
main task, according to the Declaration is “to consider the key issues arising for the 
Union’s future development and try to identify the various possible responses.” The 
vagueness of some of the Declaration’s language should not minimize the challenge: 
institutional reform together with the Convention may very well lead to the adoption of a 
European constitution. 
 
The aim of this new institutional reform, as outlined in the Laeken Declaration, is 
to establish a better division and definition of competence in the European Union, a 
simplification of the Union’s instruments, and to bring more democracy, transparency 
and efficiency into the Union. The overall goal is to create a stronger and closer Union to 
act as an effective power in the international arena, while responding more efficiently to 
the needs of its citizens. The Convention is to find answers to the most ardent EU 
problems: the lack of an EU constitution, the so-called “democratic deficit” of the Union, 
to name but a few.  While “democracy beyond the state” is not yet a handy practical 
experiment, it is possible that the Convention, made up of members of the European and 
national parliaments, government representatives, and EU commissioners, might find a 
creative solution to this problem.  
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The first step in making the EU a truly effective international power was to be 
fulfilled at Laeken through the launching of an “operational” European Security and 
Defense Force. The “last minute Greek veto” because of an agreement between the Union 
and Turkey aimed at giving the EU access to NATO assets came as a blow. Despite this 
controversy, the EU rapid-reaction force was declared “operational.” 
 
In any case, the Laeken Declaration remains one of the most “integrationist” 
among EU declarations. The federalist camp, led at Laeken by the Belgian Prime 
Minister Guy Verhofstandt, managed to openly address sensitive problems related to the 
creation of “a closer Union”. However, as Michael Stabenow wrote immediately after 
Laeken:  “Britain’s Tony Blair has not metamorphosed into a fervent federalist any more 
than Sweden’s Goran Persson has become a champion of a European army. The EU 
leaders have committed themselves only to an assessment of the convention’s 
recommendations …. Still, the convention could very well be able to hammer out a 
workable proposal ...” (Michael Stabenow – “A Real Alternative”, FAZ) 
 
What was the Convention able to hammer out in its first months of work? On July 
11-12, 2002, the European Convention held a debate on the Common Foreign and 
Security Policy. Communitarianist visions clashed with intergovernmentalism, and 
sometimes a mélange of the two approaches was heard. Peter Hain (UK Government 
representative) advanced an intergovernmental approach to the future of the EU’s 
external relations and Common Foreign and Security Policy. By contrast Peter Glotz 
(German Government representative) spoke in favor of a communitarisation of CFSP. 
Commissioner Michel Barnier argued that the EU should apply the method that has been 
delivering positive results over the last decade: namely the Community method,
 38 which 
basically means extending the capacity of the Commission to define common policies 
and act as a guardian of the common interest in the field of EU’s Foreign Policy.
39 Most 
participants spoke in favor of merging the job of the High Representative for Common 
Foreign and Security Policy with that of the Commissioner responsible for external 
affairs. However some advanced the idea of a double-hatted position, with a foot in the 
Commission and a special status to accommodate member states’ interests. A minority 
supported the status quo with some minor modifications. Alain Lamassoure submitted to 
the Convention a three-stage project leading to a full-fledged CFSP by establishing 
objectives, conditions, appropriate bodies; a project crafted along the lines of the 
preparation for the European Monetary Union.
40  Others preferred to improve coherence 
through reform within the Commission and the Council and through better coordination 
between the Council and the Commission.
41 Calls for a more “pro-active” foreign policy 
were also made. Some argued that the requirement for unanimity in CFSP restricts the 
Union’s capacity to act. However the Germans went much further then others in Brussels 
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by proposing that a single European diplomatic service should replace national ones. 
Basically,  Au Revoir Quai d’Orsay and farewell to King Charles street, writes the 
Economist.  
 
With respect to the Defense and Security Policy some members argued that the 
whole issue must be left in NATO’s care. Others called for “enhanced cooperation” to be 
extended to the area of security and defense. Some saw the development of a security and 
defense policy based on a staged approach, allowing for gradual development of 
capability.
42  In regard to the General Affairs Council, the End Term Report on the 
Convention on the Future of Europe, released September 10, 2002 states “It is widely 
agreed that this is not functioning effectively and many believe that it is necessary to 
separate the General Affairs Council from a CFSP Council. The former would consist of 
senior ministers appointed by the Prime Minister; the latter would comprise the foreign 
ministers. This is not, however, the direction taken at the recent Seville Summit, and the 
debate is likely to develop further”.  
 
Conclusions  
 
There is commitment in Brussels for accomplishing an effective institutional reform. 
Probably a middle ground between intergovermentalist positions and communitarianist 
ones ought to be found. The idea of staging the reform of Europe’s CFSP, as advanced by 
Alain Lamassoure, is probably the best at this moment. The European Union built its 
success on a functionalist basis. Therefore why not build a common voice for Europe, 
using the same “baby steps” approach? One can easily discard my argument by pointing 
out that political integration doest not equate functionalism. This is very true. However, I 
will argue that in order to build a real CFSP the Union needs to combine the Community 
method which means extending the capacity of the Commission to define common 
policies and act as a guardian of the common interest in the field of EU’s Foreign Policy 
with functionalist exercises.  
 
 
Conclusions: Could Europe have a Common Voice? 
 
Where is the EU going and what will be the future of its external relations? Which 
dimension will be more important - the international dimension or the “internal” one? 
Will Europe have a common voice in the foreseeable future? My answer to the latter 
question is that Europe has a very good chance of developing a common voice. 
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From a theoretical point of view, and with respect to international factors, realists 
argue that what Europe needs in order to develop a common voice is “perhaps a clear and 
common enemy” as Timothy Garton Ash pointed out in an article titled, “Europe has one 
voice. And Another and Another.”
43  I will soften his approach and submit for further 
research the following hypothesis:  The more conflictual the international system, the 
higher the chances of Europe to find a common voice. Crises tend to part or to bring 
together. Europe means more than “rhetoric” advanced by different heads of member 
states all over the world. Europe is not only Tony Blair’s voice, America’s “eternal” 
friend, who echoes President Bush’s determination to attack Iraq; Europe is not only 
Jacques Chirac’s voice who tries to find a mid-ground position with respect to Iraq; and it 
is not Schroeder’s voice who recently discovered the benefits of a populist approach 
toward international peace. Europe’s common voice is not always Monsieur PESC’s 
voice. The European Union is more than that. The European Union is a collection of 
institutions which nowadays, as neo-institutionalists argue, has a life of its own. 
Therefore taking an institutionalist approach, one could claim that the more coherent the 
present institutional reform is going to be, the higher the chances for Europe to find a 
common voice.  However, for the moment Europe does not have a “common” voice with 
respect to “high politics”; but it does have a common strategy (more to come). 
  
However, today’s European Union is a sui generis body in which  fights take 
place between intergovernmentalism and supranationalism (fights which call for a 
redefinition of the nation-state); between regionalism and European level actions – 
sometimes called “Europeanization”; between right-wing nationalism and rationalist 
liberal voices. Despite these disagreements, today’s Europe is a “super place,”
44 which 
many argue builds on multi-level governance,  a metaphor used to illustrate that authority 
is dispersed rather than concentrated and political action occurs at and between various 
levels of governance.
45  Presently, there is no evidence that multi-level governance 
cannot generate a common voice. To the contrary, there is strong evidence, as previously 
stated, that in “soft issues” the Union has a common voice. If one equates security with 
military power, things are certainly more complicated.  
 
Nonetheless if the international system gets more and more conflictual, academics 
might say that there are probably only two choices for Europe. The first choice will be to 
jump on the U.S. bandwagon, as Europe presently does. The second choice will be to 
counterbalance American power by developing a viable European military and/or by 
seeking allies elsewhere in the world.  However, my claim is that by having so many 
voices, Europe has managed to unintentionally create an “informal common strategy” 
with respect to “high politics” in the international arena. What kind of strategy? The 
answer here is a “pass-the-buck strategy” which plays for the moment in the Union’s 
favor. The European Union needs to buy time in order to conduct its new institutional 
reform and to emerge as a great and credible power in the international arena. 
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